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There are 98087 results for: content related to: Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?

  1. Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge

    Theoria

    Volume 80, Issue 2, May 2014, Pages: 184–190, Elizabeth Tropman

    Version of Record online : 7 APR 2014, DOI: 10.1111/theo.12044

  2. Christian Morality: An Intuitionist Account

    The Heythrop Journal

    Volume 53, Issue 4, July 2012, Pages: 560–573, Kevin Jung

    Version of Record online : 28 DEC 2011, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2011.00737.x

  3. Moral Knowledge by Perception

    Philosophical Perspectives

    Volume 18, Issue 1, December 2004, Pages: 209–228, Sarah McGrath

    Version of Record online : 1 NOV 2004, DOI: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00026.x

  4. In Defence of Cornell Realism: a Reply to Elizabeth Tropman

    Theoria

    Volume 80, Issue 2, May 2014, Pages: 174–183, Joseph Long

    Version of Record online : 30 SEP 2013, DOI: 10.1111/theo.12033

  5. THE INTUITIONIST ARGUMENT

    The Southern Journal of Philosophy

    Volume 28, Issue 1, Spring 1990, Pages: 91–114, Caroline J. Simon

    Version of Record online : 26 MAR 2010, DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1990.tb00533.x

  6. SUPERVENIENCE, EXTERNALISM AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE

    The Southern Journal of Philosophy

    Volume 24, Issue S1, Spring 1986, Pages: 43–55, William Tolhurst

    Version of Record online : 26 MAR 2010, DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01595.x

  7. Irresolvable Disagreement and the Case Against Moral Realism

    The Southern Journal of Philosophy

    Volume 34, Issue 4, Winter 1996, Pages: 411–437, Thomas Bennigson

    Version of Record online : 26 MAR 2010, DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00800.x

  8. DARWINIAN SKEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL REALISM

    Philosophical Issues

    Volume 18, Issue 1, September 2008, Pages: 186–206, David Copp

    Version of Record online : 23 SEP 2008, DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00144.x

  9. Perception, Moral

    Standard Article

    The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

    Sarah McGrath

    Published Online : 1 FEB 2013, DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee613

  10. Moral Testimony

    Philosophy Compass

    Volume 8, Issue 6, June 2013, Pages: 552–559, Alison Hills

    Version of Record online : 6 JUN 2013, DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12040

  11. Sinnott-Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism

    The Philosophical Forum

    Volume 48, Issue 2, Summer 2017, Pages: 175–199, Hossein Dabbagh

    Version of Record online : 2 MAY 2017, DOI: 10.1111/phil.12151

  12. A UNIFICATIONIST VINDICATION OF MORAL EXPLANATION

    The Philosophical Forum

    Volume 42, Issue 2, Summer 2011, Pages: 131–146, LEI ZHONG

    Version of Record online : 4 MAY 2011, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2011.00383.x

  13. Faultless Moral Disagreement

    Ratio

    Volume 26, Issue 4, December 2013, Pages: 410–427, Alison Hills

    Version of Record online : 9 OCT 2013, DOI: 10.1111/rati.12034

  14. Irrealism and the Genealogy of Morals

    Ratio

    Volume 26, Issue 4, December 2013, Pages: 351–372, Richard Joyce

    Version of Record online : 3 OCT 2013, DOI: 10.1111/rati.12027

  15. Epistemology, Moral

    Standard Article

    The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

    Geoffrey Sayre-McCord

    Published Online : 1 FEB 2013, DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee730

  16. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHETHER MORAL REALISM IS TRUE?

    The Southern Journal of Philosophy

    Volume 24, Issue S1, Spring 1986, Pages: 115–141, Nicholas Sturgeon

    Version of Record online : 26 MAR 2010, DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01600.x

  17. Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge

    The Southern Journal of Philosophy

    Volume 38, Issue 4, Winter 2000, Pages: 575–597, Michael Huemer

    Version of Record online : 26 MAR 2010, DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00916.x

  18. MORAL KNOWLEDGE, EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM, AND INTUITIONISM

    Ratio

    Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2008, Pages: 329–343, Daniel Star

    Version of Record online : 4 AUG 2008, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00405.x

  19. MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTION

    Ratio

    Volume 23, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages: 291–307, Justin P. McBrayer

    Version of Record online : 21 JUL 2010, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00468.x

  20. SOME GOOD AND BAD NEWS FOR ETHICAL INTUITIONISM

    The Philosophical Quarterly

    Volume 58, Issue 232, July 2008, Pages: 489–511, Pekka Väyrynen

    Version of Record online : 10 SEP 2007, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.528.x