Chapter 7. Human Use of Non-Human Animals: A Philosopher's Perspective
- John Bryant Professor2,
- Dr Linda Baggott la Velle3,
- Revd Dr John Searle4
Published Online: 18 APR 2002
DOI: 10.1002/0470846593.ch7
Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Book Title

Bioethics for Scientists
Additional Information
How to Cite
Frey, R.G. (2002) Human Use of Non-Human Animals: A Philosopher's Perspective, in Bioethics for Scientists (eds J. Bryant, L. B. la Velle and J. Searle), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK. doi: 10.1002/0470846593.ch7
Editor Information
- 2
School of Biological Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
- 3
Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
- 4
Exeter & District Hospice, Exeter, UK
Publication History
- Published Online: 18 APR 2002
- Published Print: 31 MAR 2002
ISBN Information
Print ISBN: 9780471495321
Online ISBN: 9780470846599
- Summary
- Chapter
Keywords:
- animal rights;
- animal welfare;
- benefit;
- causal agency;
- experiment;
- moral agency;
- moral considerability;
- moral community;
- quality of life;
- species
Summary
There is increasing debate about using animals in research. Why is it permissible to do to animals what it is impermissible to do to humans? The answer that research benefits humans does not on its own prevail because it is clear that similar research carried out on humans would provide equal benefit. The answer that it depends on species may be dealt with in considering two levels of moral considerability. At level one, both humans and animals have a quality of life that can be enhanced or diminished. On a quality-of-life basis both humans and (higher) animals have moral status. At level two we note that while animals can be causal agents they cannot be moral agents: they are outside the ‘moral community’. If this is presented as a justification for animal experimentation we should note that some humans, by reason e.g. of illness, lack moral agency while others do not enjoy quality of life.
