Standard Article

Capacity Allocation in Supply Chain Scheduling

  1. Nicholas Hall1,
  2. Zhixin Liu2

Published Online: 14 JAN 2011

DOI: 10.1002/9780470400531.eorms0133

Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

How to Cite

Hall, N. and Liu, Z. 2011. Capacity Allocation in Supply Chain Scheduling. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science. .

Author Information

  1. 1

    Department of Management Sciences, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

  2. 2

    Department of Management Studies, College of Business, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, Michigan

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 14 JAN 2011

Abstract

Capacity allocation problems, which arise frequently in manufacturing systems, include under-allocation, over-allocation, and misallocation of capacity. Such problems can originate from either the demand or the supply side. Where capacity is time-sensitive, these problems need to be resolved in tandem with other operational issues such as scheduling. This article discusses capacity allocation decisions that are modeled as cooperative or noncooperative games within research on supply chain scheduling. For cooperative game models, we focus on the existence of fair allocations of savings and/or capacity that ensure the cooperation of all the players. For noncooperative game models, we discuss the efficiency of capacity allocation mechanisms, and describe incentive schemes that attempt to resolve the problem of strategic ordering whereby players introduce false information in order to gain an advantage. We also describe several topics for future research.

Keywords:

  • supply chain scheduling;
  • capacity allocation;
  • cooperative game;
  • noncooperative game