Standard Article

Combinatorial Auctions

  1. David Porter,
  2. Stephen Rassenti

Published Online: 14 JAN 2011

DOI: 10.1002/9780470400531.eorms0159

Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

How to Cite

Porter, D. and Rassenti, S. 2011. Combinatorial Auctions. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science. .

Author Information

  1. Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, Orange, California

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 14 JAN 2011

Abstract

There are many issues that must be faced when designing an auction which involves multiple resources that must be simultaneously allocated when information concerning values for the various possible combined uses and constraints faced by the potential users is decentralized. This article examines various auction formats used to allocate resources in these combinatorial settings. While there is some consensus on the use of iterative combinatorial clock auctions for these types of allocation problems, many specific implementation issues are still open questions.

Keywords:

  • auction design;
  • combinatorics;
  • incentives;
  • decentralized processes;
  • clock auctions