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Impossibility Theorems And Voting Paradoxes In Collective Choice Theory

  1. Elizabeth Maggie Penn

Published Online: 15 FEB 2011

DOI: 10.1002/9780470400531.eorms0398

Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science

How to Cite

Penn, E. M. 2011. Impossibility Theorems And Voting Paradoxes In Collective Choice Theory. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science. .

Author Information

  1. Washington University, Department of Political Science, St. Louis, Missouri

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 15 FEB 2011

Abstract

This article provides an introduction to several of the most well known impossibility theorems in voting theory, including Arrow's theorem, May's theorem, Sen's liberal paradox, and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. It concludes with a discussion of various widely known voting paradoxes, including Condorect's paradox, Ostrogorski's paradox, and the Alabama paradox.

Keywords:

  • preference aggregation;
  • Arrow's theorem;
  • Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem;
  • May's theorem;
  • Condorcet cycle;
  • Alabama paradox