Chapter 9. Endogenous Transaction Costs, Contracts, and Economic Development

  1. Xiaokai Yang

Published Online: 14 JAN 2008

DOI: 10.1002/9780470752036.ch9

Economic Development and the Division of Labor

Economic Development and the Division of Labor

How to Cite

Yang, X. (ed) (2003) Endogenous Transaction Costs, Contracts, and Economic Development, in Economic Development and the Division of Labor, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA. doi: 10.1002/9780470752036.ch9

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 14 JAN 2008
  2. Published Print: 1 JAN 2003

ISBN Information

Print ISBN: 9780631220039

Online ISBN: 9780470752036

SEARCH

Keywords:

  • cheating;
  • decision-makers;
  • transaction costs;
  • businesses;
  • productivity

Summary

This chapter contains section titled:

  • ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

  • ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS CAUSED BY MORAL HAZARD

  • GAME MODELS AND ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS

  • THE ROLE OF NASH BARGAINING GAMES IN REDUCING ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS CAUSED BY TRADE CONFLICT

  • ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS CAUSED BY INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND HOLDING UP

  • THE GROSSMAN—HART—MOORE INCOMPLETE CONTRACT MODEL

  • NONCREDIBLE COMMITMENT AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT