Chapter 8. Imperfect Contracting in Labor Exchange
- Joyce P. Jacobsen,
- Gilbert L. Skillman
Published Online: 14 JAN 2008
DOI: 10.1002/9780470755587.ch9
Copyright © 2004 by Joyce P. Jacobsen and Gilbert L. Skillman
Book Title
Labor Markets and Employment Relationships: A Comprehensive Approach
Additional Information
How to Cite
Jacobsen, J. P. and Skillman, G. L. (eds) (2008) Imperfect Contracting in Labor Exchange, in Labor Markets and Employment Relationships: A Comprehensive Approach, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA. doi: 10.1002/9780470755587.ch9
Publication History
- Published Online: 14 JAN 2008
- Published Print: 1 JAN 2004
ISBN Information
Print ISBN: 9780631208365
Online ISBN: 9780470755587
- Summary
- Chapter
- References
Keywords:
- labor exchange;
- labor contracts;
- moral hazard;
- incomplete contracts;
- renegotiation
Summary
This chapter contains section titled:
TRANSACTION COSTS AND CONTRACTUAL FAILURES
Specification, verification, and incomplete labor contracts
Observability and asymmetric information
LABOR EXCHANGE UNDER INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS The basic setting
Asset specificity and quasi-rents
Renegotiation and the “holdup” problem
LABOR EXCHANGE UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Adverse selection and moral hazard
Labor exchange with unobservable effort: a reference case
Worker risk aversion and insurance-incentive tradeoffs
Hidden effort plus hidden productivity
CONCLUSION
THE PROBLEM OF HIDDEN EFFORT Reference case
Hidden effort with stochastic output and risk-averse worker