8. Agency Theory: Incomplete Contracting and Ownership Structure

  1. H. Kent Baker and
  2. Ronald Anderson
  1. Iain Clacher1,
  2. David Hillier2 and
  3. Patrick Mccolgan3

Published Online: 29 NOV 2011

DOI: 10.1002/9781118258439.ch8

Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice

Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice

How to Cite

Clacher, I., Hillier, D. and Mccolgan, P. (2010) Agency Theory: Incomplete Contracting and Ownership Structure, in Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice (eds H. K. Baker and R. Anderson), John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. doi: 10.1002/9781118258439.ch8

Author Information

  1. 1

    Lecturer, Leeds University Business School

  2. 2

    Professor of finance, University of Strathclyde

  3. 3

    Senior Lecturer, University of Strathclyde

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 29 NOV 2011
  2. Published Print: 20 SEP 2010

ISBN Information

Print ISBN: 9780470499139

Online ISBN: 9781118258439

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Keywords:

  • agency relationship;
  • monitoring cost;
  • residual loss;
  • bonding cost;
  • managerial risk aversion

Summary

This chapter contains sections titled:

  • Introduction

  • Agency Costs in Widely Held Corporations

  • Sources of Agency Conflicts

  • Ownership Structures and Type II Agency Costs

  • Summary and Conclusions

  • Discussion Questions

  • About the Authors