23. Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures, and Creditor Rights

  1. Robert W. Kolb
  1. Marcus H. Miller1 and
  2. Dania Thomas2

Published Online: 29 NOV 2011

DOI: 10.1002/9781118267073.ch23

Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default

Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default

How to Cite

Kolb, R. W. (2011) Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures, and Creditor Rights, in Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. doi: 10.1002/9781118267073.ch23

Author Information

  1. 1

    University of Warwick, CEPR and CSGR

  2. 2

    Keele University, CSGR

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 29 NOV 2011
  2. Published Print: 21 FEB 2011

ISBN Information

Print ISBN: 9780470922392

Online ISBN: 9781118267073

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Keywords:

  • sovereign debt restructuring;
  • creditor rights;
  • bank loans;
  • collective action clauses;
  • U.S. treasury

Summary

This chapter contains sections titled:

  • Why Do Sovereigns Pay?

  • Key Aspects of the Argentine Debt Restructuring

  • Judge-Mediated Debt Restructuring: From Default to Swap

  • CACs, Courts, and Creditor Committees

  • Conclusion

  • Notes

  • About the Authors