15. The Perceptual Quality of Color

  1. Liliana Albertazzi
  1. Anya Hurlbert

Published Online: 31 MAR 2013

DOI: 10.1002/9781118329016.ch15

Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology: Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance

Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology: Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance

How to Cite

Hurlbert, A. (2013) The Perceptual Quality of Color, in Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology: Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance (ed L. Albertazzi), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781118329016.ch15

Editor Information

  1. University of Trento Center for the Mind and Brain (CIMeC), Italy

Author Information

  1. Newcastle University, UK

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 31 MAR 2013
  2. Published Print: 30 APR 2013

ISBN Information

Print ISBN: 9781119954682

Online ISBN: 9781118329016

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Keywords:

  • color perception;
  • color physicalism;
  • color realist;
  • color subjectivism;
  • perceptual quality

Summary

The conflict between color subjectivism vs. color physicalism comes naturally to us, and has still not been settled, despite centuries of philosophical and scientific enquiry. On the subjectivist side, the Greek atomists took the stance that color was no part of the many miniscule particles that made up every object in the world; these tiny particles had shapes, sizes, speeds, and spatial configurations, but not color, taste, smell, or feel. In opposition to the subjectivists are the realists, who argue that color is physical. In the contemporary perceptual realist view, color is neither a primary nor a secondary quality. On the one hand, it is the quintessential quale, a subjective experience inaccessible to an external observer, but on the other hand, it is tightly linked to physical properties.