This chapter provides summary arguments from Wunder (2008), updated with more recent case studies.
14. Payments for Environmental Services: Conservation with Pro-Poor Benefits†
- Dilys Roe3,
- Joanna Elliott4,
- Chris Sandbrook5 and
- Matt Walpole5
Published Online: 19 NOV 2012
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Biodiversity Conservation and Poverty Alleviation: Exploring the Evidence for a Link
How to Cite
Wunder, S. and Börner, J. (2012) Payments for Environmental Services: Conservation with Pro-Poor Benefits, in Biodiversity Conservation and Poverty Alleviation: Exploring the Evidence for a Link (eds D. Roe, J. Elliott, C. Sandbrook and M. Walpole), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781118428351.ch14
Dilys Roe International Institute for Environment and Development, 80–86 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, UK
African Wildlife Foundation, Oxford, UK
United Nations Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 219 Huntingdon Road, Cambridge CB3 0DL, UK
- Published Online: 19 NOV 2012
- Published Print: 21 DEC 2012
Book Series Editors:
- Ward Cooper
Print ISBN: 9780470674796
Online ISBN: 9781118428351
- PES, pro-poor benefits;
- environmental degradation;
- innovative PES;
- PES schemes, and the poor;
- PES, voluntarily/or de facto exit;
- PES as use restricting
This chapter contains sections titled:
Do poor people sell environmental services?
Do poor people gain from selling environmental services?
Do poor environmental service users benefit from PES?
How do poor non-participants fare?