This chapter provides summary arguments from Wunder (2008), updated with more recent case studies.
14. Payments for Environmental Services: Conservation with Pro-Poor Benefits†
- Dilys Roe3,
- Joanna Elliott4,
- Chris Sandbrook5,
- Matt Walpole5
Published Online: 19 NOV 2012
DOI: 10.1002/9781118428351.ch14
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Book Title
Biodiversity Conservation and Poverty Alleviation: Exploring the Evidence for a Link
Additional Information
How to Cite
Wunder, S. and Börner, J. (2012) Payments for Environmental Services: Conservation with Pro-Poor Benefits, in Biodiversity Conservation and Poverty Alleviation: Exploring the Evidence for a Link (eds D. Roe, J. Elliott, C. Sandbrook and M. Walpole), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781118428351.ch14
Editor Information
- 3
Dilys Roe International Institute for Environment and Development, 80–86 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, UK
- 4
African Wildlife Foundation, Oxford, UK
- 5
United Nations Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 219 Huntingdon Road, Cambridge CB3 0DL, UK
- †
Publication History
- Published Online: 19 NOV 2012
- Published Print: 21 DEC 2012
ISBN Information
Print ISBN: 9780470674796
Online ISBN: 9781118428351
- Summary
- Chapter
- References
Keywords:
- PES, pro-poor benefits;
- environmental degradation;
- innovative PES;
- PES schemes, and the poor;
- PES, voluntarily/or de facto exit;
- PES as use restricting
Summary
This chapter contains sections titled:
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Introduction
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Do poor people sell environmental services?
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Do poor people gain from selling environmental services?
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Do poor environmental service users benefit from PES?
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How do poor non-participants fare?
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Conclusions
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References