26. Time in Mind

  1. Heather Dyke and
  2. Adrian Bardon
  1. Julian Kiverstein1 and
  2. Valtteri Arstila2

Published Online: 29 JAN 2013

DOI: 10.1002/9781118522097.ch26

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

How to Cite

Kiverstein, J. and Arstila, V. (2013) Time in Mind, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time (eds H. Dyke and A. Bardon), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781118522097.ch26

Editor Information

  1. University of Otago in New Zealand

Author Information

  1. 1

    University of Amsterdam's Institute of Logic, The Netherlands

  2. 2

    University of Turku, Finland

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 29 JAN 2013
  2. Published Print: 15 FEB 2013

ISBN Information

Print ISBN: 9780470658819

Online ISBN: 9781118522097



  • Grush's trajectory estimation;
  • human mind;
  • Husserl;
  • Orwellian interpretation;
  • postdiction;
  • predictive inference model;
  • supervenience thesis (SUP);
  • temporal experience;
  • time


A theoretical assumption of this chapter on time in mind is that people ought to take phenomenological descriptions of temporal experience at face value. The chapter begins with a brief review of Rick Grush's trajectory estimation model of temporal representation – the predictive inference model. It introduces the issues of whether temporal properties as they appear should be thought of as primary or secondary qualities. A constraint runs from the best science of the mind back to phenomenology that the best phenomenological descriptions of experience cohere with the best science of the human mind. Grush's model bears a close resemblance to computational theories in neuroscience that take perception to consist in predictive inference. A section explains the relationship between the Orwellian interpretation of postdiction and the Husserlian view of temporal experience. The chapter also presents a discussion on “the time as its own representation view” (TOR) and supervenience thesis (SUP).