Chapter 25. What a Difference Emotions Make

  1. Timothy O'Connor Professor of Philosophy member2 and
  2. Constantine Sandis Senior Lecturer3,4
  1. Sabine A. Döring Professor of Philosophy

Published Online: 29 JUL 2010

DOI: 10.1002/9781444323528.ch25

A Companion to the Philosophy of Action

A Companion to the Philosophy of Action

How to Cite

Döring, S. A. (2010) What a Difference Emotions Make, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (eds T. O'Connor and C. Sandis), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444323528.ch25

Editor Information

  1. 2

    Indiana University, USA

  2. 3

    Oxford Brookes University, UK

  3. 4

    New York University in London, UK

Author Information

  1. Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 29 JUL 2010
  2. Published Print: 30 APR 2010

ISBN Information

Print ISBN: 9781405187350

Online ISBN: 9781444323528



  • emotions and what a difference they make;
  • model of the explanation of intentional action - the ‘belief–desire model’ (BD);
  • influential way of cashing out BD - Humean theory of motivation (HTM);
  • ‘pro-attitude’ sense of ‘desire’ - entailing the very definition of intentional action;
  • emotions, motivating different kinds of behavior, not only intentional actions aiming at some end;
  • expressive action, cannot be explained in terms of goal-directedness;
  • mere evaluations and the ‘felt’ or ‘affective evaluations’ - characteristic of emotion;
  • emotions' concern-based evaluative content - explaining why sometimes they do provide goals for action;
  • Quinn, distinguishing between explanation - of an action and its “rationalization”;
  • agents, cultivating their emotions over time


This chapter contains sections titled:

  • References

  • Further reading