Chapter Three. Ir-Content and the Set of Worlds Where a Sentence is True
Published Online: 13 AUG 2010
DOI: 10.1002/9781444325362.ch3
Copyright © 2010 Frank Jackson
Book Title

Language, Names, and Information
Additional Information
How to Cite
Jackson, F. (2010) Ir-Content and the Set of Worlds Where a Sentence is True, in Language, Names, and Information, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444325362.ch3
Publication History
- Published Online: 13 AUG 2010
- Published Print: 6 AUG 2010
ISBN Information
Print ISBN: 9781405161589
Online ISBN: 9781444325362
- Summary
- Chapter
Keywords:
- ir-content and set of worlds - where a sentence is true;
- ir-content of “Some things are round” - set of worlds, where the sentence is true;
- case of proper names;
- “The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn by Mark Twain” and “Samuel Clemens, author of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn”;
- two modes of presentation - corresponding to two different bearers of credence;
- individuation issue distinction - from epistemological issues;
- ‘within a world’ version of argument - using the difference principle;
- sentences with “actually” and “actual” - as rigidification devices;
- natural kind terms - sentences whose ir-content is not given by worlds at which they are true, but sentences with natural kind terms;
- “There is water nearby” - sentences, that we would expect to have a centered content
Summary
This chapter contains sections titled:
Preamble
The case of proper names
The difference principle
The ‘within a world’ version of the argument using the difference principle
Sentences containing “actual” and “actually”
Demonstrative adjectives
Natural kind terms
A passing comment on centering
Where to from here?
