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Value Realism

  1. Graham Oddie

Published Online: 1 FEB 2013

DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

How to Cite

Oddie, G. 2013. Value Realism. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. .

Publication History

  1. Published Online: 1 FEB 2013


Value realism, roughly speaking, is the thesis that value claims (such as friendship is good and burning baby's feet for fun is bad) can be literally true or false; that some such claims are indeed true; that their truth is not simply a matter of any individual's subjective attitudes or even of the attitudes of some larger collective; and that facts about value enjoy a certain metaphysical independence from other matters of fact. As this first rough characterization might suggest, realism about value is a matter of degree. While the robust value antirealist will reject all four claims, there are a variety of realist positions from weak objective idealist views, to mind-independent naturalist views, and finally robustly non-naturalist views of value.


  • metaethics;
  • value