Research Article
Mechanisms for enhancing the credibility of an adviser: prepayment and aligned incentives
Article first published online: 7 SEP 2006
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.532
Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Additional Information
How to Cite
Patt, A. G., Bowles, H. R. and Cash, D. W. (2006), Mechanisms for enhancing the credibility of an adviser: prepayment and aligned incentives. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19: 347–359. doi: 10.1002/bdm.532
Publication History
- Issue published online: 21 SEP 2006
- Article first published online: 7 SEP 2006
Funded by
- US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Global Programs (NOAA/OGP). Grant Numbers: NA16GP2577, BCS-0004236
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
Keywords:
- advice;
- judge adviser systems;
- trust;
- sustainable development
Abstract
We tested the effectiveness of prepayment for advice and aligned incentives as mechanisms for enhancing trust in unfamiliar advisers in decision-making under uncertainty. Participants were low-income Zimbabweans who played two rounds of the Monty Hall three-door game. In round 1, participants who purchased advice were significantly more likely to follow advice for how to win the game than were participants who received free advice. In round 2, the apparent effectiveness of advisers' suggestions in round 1 moderated participants' propensity to follow advice. If the round 1 advice appeared wrong, the credibility enhancing benefits of prepayment diminished. If the advice appeared right, the benefits of prepayment maintained. Hypotheses with regard to the benefits of aligned incentives received only weak support. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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