The big carrot: High-stakes incentives revisited
Article first published online: 29 JUN 2009
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Volume 23, Issue 3, pages 288–313, July 2010
How to Cite
Brañas-Garza, P., García-Muñoz, T. and Neuman, S. (2010), The big carrot: High-stakes incentives revisited. J. Behav. Decis. Making, 23: 288–313. doi: 10.1002/bdm.657
- Issue published online: 28 JUN 2010
- Article first published online: 29 JUN 2009
- MCI. Grant Number: (SEJ2007-62081/ECON)
- Instituto de la Mujer. Grant Number: (2007 I+D+I/031)
- Junta de Andalucia Excelencia. Grant Number: (P07.SEJ.02547)
- high-stakes incentives;
- economics of religion;
- JEL Classification;
Using an international dataset of about 35 000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations). Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.