Externalities Awareness in Anticommons Dilemmas Decreases Defective Behavior
Article first published online: 24 JAN 2011
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Volume 25, Issue 3, pages 228–238, July 2012
How to Cite
Dhont, K., Van Hiel, A. and De Cremer, D. (2012), Externalities Awareness in Anticommons Dilemmas Decreases Defective Behavior. J. Behav. Decis. Making, 25: 228–238. doi: 10.1002/bdm.718
- Issue published online: 14 MAY 2012
- Article first published online: 24 JAN 2011
- social dilemmas;
- decision making;
The present paper explores the effect of the salience of collective consequences of opportunistic behavior in commons and anticommons dilemmas. Making this type of externalities salient was expected to increase the awareness of the conflict between collective and personal interests, especially in the anticommons dilemma. The results of a vignette study (Study 1, N = 100) and a laboratory experiment (Study 2, N = 55) confirmed our hypotheses, revealing more opportunistic behavior in the anticommons than in the commons dilemma when externalities were not made salient, while no significant dilemma effect was obtained when the externalities were made salient. Moreover, the results of Study 2 demonstrated that the dilemma effect on cooperation was mediated by externalities awareness. The positive effects of increments in externalities awareness on cooperation are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.