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Institutional Ownership and Corporate Investment Performance

  1. Scott Fung1,
  2. Shih-Chuan Tsai2,*

Article first published online: 21 DEC 2012

DOI: 10.1002/cjas.1232

Issue

Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration

Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration

Volume 29, Issue 4, pages 348–365, December 2012

Additional Information

How to Cite

Fung, S. and Tsai, S.-C. (2012), Institutional Ownership and Corporate Investment Performance. CAN J ADM SCI, 29: 348–365. doi: 10.1002/cjas.1232

Author Information

  1. 1

    California State University, East Bay

  2. 2

    National Taiwan Normal University

*Shih-Chuan Tsai, College of Management, National Taiwan Normal University. Email: chuant@ntnu.edu.tw Scott Fung, College of Business and Economics, California State University, East Bay. Email: scott.fung@csueastbay.edu

  1. We thank Jason Wei (the editor), the associate editor, and two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and comments. We also thank Richard Chung and Jed DeVaro for their helpful suggestions. Fung would like to acknowledge the financial supports from Faculty Research Grant from College of Business and Economics, California State University East Bay. Tsai would like to acknowledge the financial support from National Science Council of Taiwan (grant #NSC98-2410-H-275-004)

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 21 DEC 2012
  2. Article first published online: 21 DEC 2012

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