Research Article

Exploring the robustness of BitTorrent peer-to-peer content distribution systems†

  1. Nikitas Liogkas*,
  2. Robert Nelson,
  3. Eddie Kohler,
  4. Lixia Zhang

Article first published online: 1 MAY 2007

DOI: 10.1002/cpe.1187

Issue

Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience

Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience

Special Issue: Recent Advances in Peer-to-Peer Systems and Security (P2P 2006)

Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 179–189, February 2008

Additional Information

How to Cite

Liogkas, N., Nelson, R., Kohler, E. and Zhang, L. (2008), Exploring the robustness of BitTorrent peer-to-peer content distribution systems. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 20: 179–189. doi: 10.1002/cpe.1187

Author Information

  1. University of California–Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, U.S.A.

*UCLA Computer Science Department, 3440 Boelter Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095, U.S.A.

  1. †

    A shorter version of this work appeared at IPTPS'06 [1]

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 19 DEC 2007
  2. Article first published online: 1 MAY 2007
  3. Manuscript Accepted: 30 JAN 2007
  4. Manuscript Revised: 25 JAN 2007
  5. Manuscript Received: 30 SEP 2006

Funded by

  • National Science Foundation. Grant Number: 0230921

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Keywords:

  • BitTorrent;
  • exploits;
  • free-riding;
  • robustness;
  • selfish

Abstract

This paper assesses BitTorrent's robustness against selfish peers who try to download content faster than their fair share by abusing existing protocol mechanisms. We present three exploits that can deliver potential benefits to a selfish peer and evaluate their impact on both public and private download sessions. Our results show that BitTorrent is quite robust against these exploits. Although selfish peers can sometimes attain high download throughput and compliant peers' download rates suffer slightly in consequence, we observe no significant degradation of the overall system's quality of service. We identify scenarios where a selfish peer could attain significant benefits at the expense of compliant peers, and discuss the protocol characteristics that render these scenarios unlikely and hence lead to the system's robustness. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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