Research Article
Robust incentives via multi-level Tit-for-Tat
Article first published online: 1 MAY 2007
DOI: 10.1002/cpe.1190
Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Issue
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Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
Special Issue: Recent Advances in Peer-to-Peer Systems and Security (P2P 2006)
Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 167–178, February 2008
Additional Information
How to Cite
Lian, Q., Peng, Y., Yang, M., Zhang, Z., Dai, Y. and Li, X. (2008), Robust incentives via multi-level Tit-for-Tat. Concurrency Computat.: Pract. Exper., 20: 167–178. doi: 10.1002/cpe.1190
Publication History
- Issue published online: 19 DEC 2007
- Article first published online: 1 MAY 2007
- Manuscript Accepted: 30 JAN 2007
- Manuscript Revised: 23 JAN 2007
- Manuscript Received: 21 SEP 2006
Funded by
- National Grand Fundamental Research 973 program of China. Grant Number: 2004CB318204
- National Natural Science Foundation of China. Grant Number: 60673183
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
Keywords:
- P2P;
- incentive;
- collusion
Abstract
Much work has been done to address the need for incentive models in real deployed peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, we discuss problems found with the incentive model in a large, deployed peer-to-peer network, Maze. We evaluate several alternatives, and propose an incentive system that generates preferences for well-behaved nodes while correctly punishing colluders. We discuss our proposal as a hybrid between Tit-for-Tat and EigenTrust, and show its effectiveness through simulation of real traces of the Maze system. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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