Research Article

Identification and authentication of integrated circuits

  1. Blaise Gassend1,*,
  2. Daihyun Lim2,
  3. Dwaine Clarke2,
  4. Marten van Dijk3,
  5. Srinivas Devadas2

Article first published online: 6 AUG 2004

DOI: 10.1002/cpe.805

Issue

Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience

Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience

Special Issue: Computer Security

Volume 16, Issue 11, pages 1077–1098, September 2004

Additional Information

How to Cite

Gassend, B., Lim, D., Clarke, D., van Dijk, M. and Devadas, S. (2004), Identification and authentication of integrated circuits. Concurrency Computat.: Pract. Exper., 16: 1077–1098. doi: 10.1002/cpe.805

Author Information

  1. 1

    Research Lab for Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, U.S.A.

  2. 2

    Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, U.S.A.

  3. 3

    Prof Holstlaan 4, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

*Research Lab for Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, U.S.A.

Publication History

  1. Issue published online: 6 AUG 2004
  2. Article first published online: 6 AUG 2004
  3. Manuscript Revised: JUN 2003
  4. Manuscript Accepted: JUN 2003
  5. Manuscript Received: MAR 2003

SEARCH

SEARCH BY CITATION

ARTICLE TOOLS

Get PDF (250K)

Keywords:

  • authentication;
  • identification;
  • physical random function;
  • physical security;
  • smartcard;
  • tamper resistance;
  • unclonability

Abstract

This paper describes a technique to reliably and securely identify individual integrated circuits (ICs) based on the precise measurement of circuit delays and a simple challenge–response protocol. This technique could be used to produce key-cards that are more difficult to clone than ones involving digital keys on the IC. We consider potential venues of attack against our system, and present candidate implementations. Experiments on Field Programmable Gate Arrays show that the technique is viable, but that our current implementations could require some strengthening before it can be considered as secure. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Get PDF (250K)