Equity and individual preferences in an MDG
Article first published online: 22 FEB 2006
Copyright © 1986 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
European Journal of Social Psychology
Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 131–148, April/June 1986
How to Cite
Wilke, H. A. M., Liebrand, W. B. G., Lotgerink, B. and Buurma, B. (1986), Equity and individual preferences in an MDG. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol., 16: 131–148. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420160203
- Issue published online: 22 FEB 2006
- Article first published online: 22 FEB 2006
- Manuscript Revised: 29 MAY 1985
- Manuscript Received: 5 OCT 1984
Before participating in an Maximizing Difference Game (MDG) subjects were classified with the help of a social motive test (GDG, Liebrand, 1984) as having a cooperative, an individualistic or a Competitive preference for own/other outcome distributions. Thereafter subjects did make choices in an MDG. A status (high, equal, low, no feedback) × matrix (advantage: 8/6, disadvantage 6/81) × preference (competitive, individualistic, cooperative)-design was employed, whereas one control condition, i.e. equal statuslmatrix equal (616) was added.
Equity theory could explain the data rather well. Support was found for the status hypothesis, i.e. high status subjects made more D-choices in an MDG than equal status subjects; equal status subjects made more D-choices than low status subjects, and for the matrix hypothesis, i.e. matrix disadvantage subjects made more D-choices than subjects playing in a matrix advantage position. Equity theory could also explain a significant status × matrix interaction effect. Support was partly found for a preference hypothesis: Competitors made more D-choices than cooperatives, while contrary to the hypothesis, individualists behaved more like competitors.