Will moral outrage stand up?: Distinguishing among emotional reactions to a moral violation
Version of Record online: 8 MAY 2010
Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
European Journal of Social Psychology
Volume 41, Issue 2, pages 173–179, March 2011
How to Cite
O'Mara, E. M., Jackson, L. E., Batson, C. D. and Gaertner, L. (2011), Will moral outrage stand up?: Distinguishing among emotional reactions to a moral violation. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol., 41: 173–179. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.754
- Issue online: 21 FEB 2011
- Version of Record online: 8 MAY 2010
- Manuscript Accepted: 24 FEB 2010
- Manuscript Received: 14 OCT 2009
Moral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—is claimed to be a prevalent and powerful moral emotion. However, evidence for moral outrage has been compromised by failure to distinguish it from personal anger—anger at harm to self—felt by victims of a moral violation. Although it does not seem possible to distinguish these two forms of anger by measurement, it is possible to do so by experimental manipulation of their distinct eliciting conditions. Extending previous research, the current study manipulated how a victim (self vs. stranger) was excluded (fairly vs. unfairly) from a favorable experience. Reported anger and behavioral retribution provided evidence of personal anger and revenge, not of moral outrage. These findings suggest that the prevalence and power of moral outrage has been exaggerated. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.