Statement of funding: this study was financially supported by the Dutch Ministry of Health.
MORAL HAZARD AND SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN GENERAL PRACTICE†
Article first published online: 20 FEB 2012
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume 22, Issue 3, pages 340–352, March 2013
How to Cite
van Dijk, C. E., van den Berg, B., Verheij, R. A., Spreeuwenberg, P., Groenewegen, P. P. and de Bakker, D. H. (2013), MORAL HAZARD AND SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN GENERAL PRACTICE. Health Econ., 22: 340–352. doi: 10.1002/hec.2801
Supporting information may be found in the online version of this article.
- Issue published online: 5 FEB 2013
- Article first published online: 20 FEB 2012
- Manuscript Accepted: 10 JAN 2012
- Manuscript Revised: 5 JAN 2012
- Manuscript Received: 20 AUG 2010
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