The conjunction fallacy: explanations of the linda problem by the theory of hints

Authors

  • Hans Wolfgang Brachinger,

    Corresponding author
    1. Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Fribourg, Beauregard 13, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
    • Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Fribourg, Beauregard 13, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
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  • Paul-André Monney

    1. Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Fribourg, Beauregard 13, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
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Abstract

Empirical research has shown that in some situations, subjects tend to assign a probability to a conjunction of two events that is larger than the probability they assign to each of these two events. This empirical phenomenon is traditionally called the conjunction fallacy. One of the best-known experiments used to demonstrate the conjunction fallacy is the Linda problem introduced by Tversky and Kahneman in 1982. They explain the “fallacious behavior” by their so-called judgemental heuristics. These heuristics have been criticized heavily as being far “too vague to count as explanations”. In this article, it is shown that the “fallacious behavior” in the Linda problem can be explained by the so-called theory of hints. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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