Justifying the Justification Hypothesis: Scientific-humanism, Equilintegration (EI) Theory, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI)
Article first published online: 19 NOV 2004
Copyright © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Clinical Psychology
Special Issue: Defining Psychology: Articles and Commentaries on a New Unified Theory (Part 2)
Volume 61, Issue 1, pages 81–106, January 2005
How to Cite
Shealy, C. N. (2005), Justifying the Justification Hypothesis: Scientific-humanism, Equilintegration (EI) Theory, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI). J. Clin. Psychol., 61: 81–106. doi: 10.1002/jclp.20092
- Issue published online: 8 DEC 2004
- Article first published online: 19 NOV 2004
The Justification Hypothesis (JH; Henriques, 2003) is a basic, general, and macro-level construct that is highly compelling. However, it needs greater specification (i.e., justification) regarding what it is, how it might be operationalized and measured, and what it does and does not predict in the real world. In the present analysis, the act of “justification” is conceptualized as the ongoing attempt to convince self and/or others that one's beliefs and values, which is to say one's “version of reality” or VOR, is correct, defensible, and good. In addressing these issues, this paper is divided into two complementary parts: (a) consideration of justification dynamics and exemplars from a scientific-humanist perspective and (b) an examination of how justification systems and processes have been studied vis-à-vis research and theory on beliefs and values as well as an extant model—Equilintegration (EI) Theory—and method—the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI). © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Clin Psychol.