WHY DO FIRMS PAY BRIBES? FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM THE CAMBODIAN GARMENT INDUSTRY
Version of Record online: 12 MAY 2011
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal of International Development
Volume 25, Issue 2, pages 276–292, March 2013
How to Cite
Kasuga, H. (2013), WHY DO FIRMS PAY BRIBES? FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM THE CAMBODIAN GARMENT INDUSTRY. J. Int. Dev., 25: 276–292. doi: 10.1002/jid.1787
- Issue online: 25 FEB 2013
- Version of Record online: 12 MAY 2011
- Manuscript Accepted: 2 FEB 2011
- Manuscript Received: 19 MAY 2009
- Japan Economic Research Foundation
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