Research Article
Blindness to alternative scenarios in evidence evaluation
Article first published online: 25 MAR 2010
DOI: 10.1002/jip.116
Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Issue
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Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling
Volume 7, Issue 2, pages 153–163, June 2010
Additional Information
How to Cite
Rassin, E. (2010), Blindness to alternative scenarios in evidence evaluation. J. Investig. Psych. Offender Profil., 7: 153–163. doi: 10.1002/jip.116
Publication History
- Issue published online: 13 MAY 2010
- Article first published online: 25 MAR 2010
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
Keywords:
- alternative scenarios;
- confirmation bias;
- tunnel vision;
- evidence
Abstract
In order to prevent miscarriages of justice, police, prosecution, and judges must remain open to alternative scenarios in which the suspect is in fact innocent. In recent years, however, several studies have delivered results suggesting that open-mindedness is not always standard in criminal procedures. For example, Ask and Granhag (2005) found that police officers' estimation of the incriminating power of investigation findings was not affected by knowledge of an alternative suspect. The current first study replicated these findings in a mixed sample of police officers, district attorneys, and judges. In Study 2, this blindness to alternative scenarios did not emerge in a sample of university students. However, the estimation of the incriminating power of the evidence and the willingness to convict the primary suspect were predicted with the participants' confirmation proneness. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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