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A preliminary version was presented at the COMSOC-06 workshop and a preliminary, seven-page version of this paper appeared in IJCAI-07 [2]. Supported in part by DFG grants RO-1202/{9-1, 9-3, 11-1, 12-1}, NSF grants CCR-0311021, CCF-0426761, and IIS-0713061, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation's TransCoop program, the ESF's EUROCORES program LogICCC, and two Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Awards. Work done in part while the first two authors were visiting Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf and while the third author was visiting the University of Rochester.
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Original Paper
Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control†
Article first published online: 17 JUL 2009
DOI: 10.1002/malq.200810019
Copyright © 2009 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim
Additional Information
How to Cite
Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L. A. and Rothe, J. (2009), Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 55: 397–424. doi: 10.1002/malq.200810019
- †
Publication History
- Issue published online: 17 JUL 2009
- Article first published online: 17 JUL 2009
- Manuscript Accepted: 17 FEB 2009
- Manuscript Revised: 16 FEB 2009
- Manuscript Received: 26 SEP 2008
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
Keywords:
- Computational social choice;
- multiagent systems;
- preference aggregation;
- computational complexity
Abstract
Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer (“the chair”) to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The important paper of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [1] that introduces (constructive) control proposes computational complexity as a means of resisting control attempts: Look for election systems where the chair's task in seeking control is itself computationally infeasible.
We introduce and study a method of combining two or more candidate-anonymous election schemes in such a way that the combined scheme possesses all the resistances to control (i.e., all the NP-hardnesses of control) possessed by any of its constituents: It combines their strengths. From this and new resistance constructions, we prove for the first time that there exists a neutral, anonymous election scheme (whose winner problem is computable in polynomial time) that is resistant to all twenty standard types of electoral control (© 2009 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)