CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision
Article first published online: 22 FEB 2006
Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Managerial and Decision Economics
Volume 27, Issue 5, pages 363–378, July/August 2006
How to Cite
F. Brazel, J. and Webb, E. (2006), CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision. Manage. Decis. Econ., 27: 363–378. doi: 10.1002/mde.1268
- Issue published online: 20 JUL 2006
- Article first published online: 22 FEB 2006
Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short-term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity-based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity-based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity-based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.