Partner Characteristics, Information Asymmetry, and the Signaling Effects of Joint Ventures


Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110 8th street, Troy, NY 12180, USA. E-mail:


We provide theory and evidence regarding the signaling effects of joint venture (JV) announcements. We argue that when a firm characterized by information asymmetry with respect to the stock market announces a JV, the growth opportunities and the quality of resources of the partner provides a signal to investors about the true value of the firm. Our study shows that (i) apart from synergies, JV announcements impact firm value also because of the information they convey about future growth opportunities; and (ii) JVs may not only validate but also ‘invalidate’ the quality of a firm by revealing that it is unable to attract strong partners. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.