The Impact of CEO Tenure on Cooperative Governance
Article first published online: 2 JAN 2013
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Managerial and Decision Economics
Special Issue: Governance of Franchising Networks, Cooperatives and Alliances
Volume 34, Issue 3-5, pages 218–229, April-July 2013
How to Cite
Cook, M. L. and Burress, M. J. (2013), The Impact of CEO Tenure on Cooperative Governance. Manage. Decis. Econ., 34: 218–229. doi: 10.1002/mde.2585
- Issue published online: 8 APR 2013
- Article first published online: 2 JAN 2013
This paper investigates whether long-tenured cooperative chief executive officers (CEOs) are successful in negotiating less monitoring, resulting in the cooperative being agent driven. Utilizing a sample of the 1000 largest US agricultural cooperatives, we examine whether boards of long-tenured CEOs exhibit differences in composition, formal committees, or procedures that may indicate these boards are more lenient monitors. We find long-tenured CEOs experience less board monitoring. This result is primarily due to a difference in procedural mechanisms, rather than board composition. However, it is unclear whether monitoring leniency is an indication of the CEO's ability to negotiate less monitoring. It remains a possibility that CEOs with shorter tenures also influence the board; but their recommendations may be heavily influenced by non-compulsory conformance with stricter corporate governance regulations. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.