Do anti-ticket scalping laws make a difference?
Article first published online: 10 NOV 2006
Copyright © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Managerial and Decision Economics
Volume 15, Issue 5, pages 503–509, September/October 1994
How to Cite
Williams, A. T. (1994), Do anti-ticket scalping laws make a difference?. Manage. Decis. Econ., 15: 503–509. doi: 10.1002/mde.4090150512
- Issue published online: 10 NOV 2006
- Article first published online: 10 NOV 2006
Ticket scalping is the practice of buying tickets at one price and reselling them at a higher one. The practice is controversial and currently almost half the states regulate the resale of tickets to one degree or another. As with other laws that regulate economic activity, the question immediately arises: ‘Who benefits from the law?’ Economists typically view transactions between willing buyers and willing sellers, such as ticket scalping, as welfare improving. They also view any interference with free market transactions as suspect and as possible evidence of rent harvesting. In an attempt to quantify the economic impact of anti-ticket scalping laws this paper presents a regression model of ticket price determination for National Football League teams and uses it to test the proposition ‘Do anti-ticket scalping laws make a difference?’