International Journal of Network Management

Cover image for Vol. 21 Issue 1

Special Issue: Economic Traffic Management

January/February 2011

Volume 21, Issue 1

Pages i–ii, 1–82

Issue edited by: Burkhard Stiller

  1. Issue Information

    1. Top of page
    2. Issue Information
    3. Editorials
    4. Research Articles
    1. You have free access to this content
  2. Editorials

    1. Top of page
    2. Issue Information
    3. Editorials
    4. Research Articles
    1. You have free access to this content
      Editorial to the special issue on Economic Traffic Management (pages 1–2)

      David Hausheer, George D. Stamoulis and Burkhard Stiller

      Article first published online: 13 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1002/nem.773

  3. Research Articles

    1. Top of page
    2. Issue Information
    3. Editorials
    4. Research Articles
    1. Mitigating unfairness in locality-aware peer-to-peer networks (pages 3–20)

      Frank Lehrieder, Simon Oechsner, Tobias Hoßfeld, Dirk Staehle, Zoran Despotovic, Wolfgang Kellerer and Maximilian Michel

      Article first published online: 25 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1002/nem.772

      Thumbnail image of graphical abstract

      Locality awareness is considered as a promising approach to increase the efficiency of content distribution by peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, e.g., BitTorrent. However, current implementation proposals for locality awareness can lead to performance deteriorations for some of the users. In this study, we propose and evaluate refinements of current proposals, which mitigate the unfairness introduced by original mechanisms. This is a key requirement for a broad acceptance of the concept of locality awareness in the user community of P2P networks.

    2. Access link bandwidth externalities and endogenous Internet growth: a long-run economic approach (pages 21–44)

      Athanassios Androutsos

      Article first published online: 25 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1002/nem.771

      Thumbnail image of graphical abstract

      In this paper, we explore the broad issues associated with developing an economic model of access link bandwidth growth. In the proposed model bandwidth of the access link grows endogenously based on the increasing performance and QoS requirements of the emerging Internet applications that have resulted in massive increases in demand for access capacity rates. A significant consideration of this model is that bandwidth exhibits substantial externalities or spillovers since decisions on bandwidth levels made by a single user affect all other user levels of performance.

    3. Traffic engineering supported by Inherent Network Management: analysis of resource efficiency and cost saving potential (pages 45–64)

      Gerhard Haßlinger, Giorgio Nunzi, Catalin Meirosu, Changpeng Fan and Frank-Uwe Andersen

      Article first published online: 25 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1002/nem.770

      Thumbnail image of graphical abstract

      We present Inherent Network Management as a concept to integrate distributed autonomous and self-organizing management functions in the network nodes to cope with dynamic and heterogeneous communication environments as part of the future Internet. The main focus is on traffic engineering algorithms for maximum network-wide throughput, which rely on advanced monitoring and fast redirection of transport paths in failure situations. Our analysis reveals that enhanced situation awareness and flexible adaptation allows for an increased utilization level in transmission and routing capacities leading to savings in capital expenditure and in energy consumption.

    4. Technological investment games among wireless telecommunications service providers (pages 65–82)

      Patrick Maillé, Bruno Tuffin and Jean-Marc Vigne

      Article first published online: 25 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1002/nem.776

      Thumbnail image of graphical abstract

      In the competitive telecommunication market, network operators seek to maximize their revenue by playing on price and choosing the technologies they will implement, comparing the required licence and infrastructure cost to the expected additional revenue they will bring. Our paper analyzes thanks to non-cooperative game-theoretic tools a three levels model representing the chain of decisions of customers and providers: decision of technology and operator for users at the lowest time scale, price war among providers at the intermediate time scale, and finally decision of the technologies to implement by providers at the highest time scale.

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