I owe great thanks to those who discussed with me the ideas in this Article, which was based on my MA thesis paper. Special thanks to my supervisors Dr. Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan and professor David Levi-Faur from the Federmann School of Public Policy and Government of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I benefited greatly from their insight and commentaries.
Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008
Version of Record online: 10 NOV 2011
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal of Public Affairs
Volume 12, Issue 4, pages 270–278, November 2012
How to Cite
Veksler, A. (2012), Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008. J. Publ. Aff., 12: 270–278. doi: 10.1002/pa.431
- Issue online: 22 NOV 2012
- Version of Record online: 10 NOV 2011
- Manuscript Revised: 29 SEP 2011
- Manuscript Accepted: 29 SEP 2011
- Manuscript Received: 5 JUN 2011
- Lobbying regulations;
After some failed attempts to regulate the lobbying, the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—passed the Lobbyist Law on April 2nd 2008. Although lobbying is a common and legitimate part of the democratic process, it raises issues of trust, equality of access, and transparency. What motivated the MKs to regulate lobbying—public interest, private interest, or symbolic politics? The MKs claimed that the law was needed for improving transparency whereas MK Yechimovich declared that it balances the strength of the rich, represented by lobbyists and the wide public. Assessing the achieved transparency in the comparative framework of other lobbying regulatory regimes, we see that the law confers tangible benefits on powerful interest groups, while providing only symbolic gestures to the public. Lack of information available for MKs creates a need for lobbyists for political intelligence and MKs need to identify the interests in play to guarantee for themselves the necessary legislative subsidy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.