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Keywords:

  • cross-layer;
  • jamming;
  • security;
  • game theory;
  • ad hoc networks

ABSTRACT

The objective of jamming attacks in a network is to deny service to the communicating nodes, thus reducing network throughput and availability. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework for detecting jamming attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. We formulate jamming as a two-player, non-cooperative game to analyze the interaction between the attacker and the monitoring nodes in the network. We propose hybrid detection strategies at the monitor node by using cross-layer features for attack detection. We solve the game by computing the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and derive the optimal attack and detection strategies. Numerical results show that game theoretic analysis can be used to determine the optimal steady-state monitoring strategies to provide higher detection accuracy, while balancing the monitoring energy costs. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.