A signature scheme is one of the important primitives in modern cryptography, which may offer functionalities of user identification, non-repudiation, and message authentication. With the advent of identity (ID)-based public key systems with bilinear pairings defined on elliptic curves, many ID-based signature schemes have been proposed. Like certificate-based public key systems, any ID-based public key system must provide a revocation method to revoke misbehaving users. There was little work on studying the revocation problem of ID-based public key systems, and no ID-based signature scheme deals with how to revoke the signing ability of misbehaving users. Quite recently, Tseng and Tsai presented a practical revocation mechanism using a public channel for ID-based public key systems. In this paper, we adopt Tseng and Tsai's revocation concept to define the new framework and security notions of revocable ID-based signature (RIBS) scheme and propose the first RIBS scheme in the standard model. Under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption, we demonstrate that the proposed RIBS scheme is provably secure while remaining efficient for signing and verification as compared with previously proposed ID-based signature schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.