Key revocation plays an essential role in ensuring the confidentiality of wireless sensor networks following the compromise of one or more of the network nodes. The distributed key revocation protocol presented by Chan et al. has a rapid reaction time and avoids the single-point failure problem inherent in centralized schemes. However, the scheme is computationally complex, requires a large storage space, and incurs high communication overheads. Accordingly, this paper proposes a novel distributed, scalable, and cost-effective key revocation scheme based on Blom's t-secure property. In the proposed approach, any node identified as having a malicious behavior by t or more sensor nodes is categorized as a compromised node, and its keys are immediately revoked from the entire network. The proposed scheme not only satisfies the rigorous definition of a distributed key revocation protocol but also yields a significant improvement over Chan's revocation scheme in terms of a lower storage space requirement, a reduced communication overhead, and a lower computational cost. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.