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Argument on biometrics identity-based encryption schemes

Authors

  • Syh-Yuan Tan,

    1. Faculty of Engineering and Science, Tunku Abdul Rahman University, Perak, Malaysia
    2. Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia
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  • Zhe Jin,

    1. Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia
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  • Andrew Beng Jin Teoh

    Corresponding author
    1. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
    2. Predictive Intelligence Research Cluster, Sunway University, Bandar Sunway, P.J. Selangor, Malaysia
    • Correspondence: Andrew Teoh, School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea.

      E-mail: bjteoh@yonsei.ac.kr

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ABSTRACT

Recently, a few biometric identity-based encryption (BIO-IBE) schemes have been proposed. BIO-IBE leverages both fuzzy extractor and Lagrange polynomial to extract biometric feature as a user public key and as a preventive measure of collusion attack, respectively. In this paper, we reveal that BIO-IBE is not realistic whereby a query of fresh biometrics is needed for each encryption process. Moreover, the use of both fuzzy extractor and Lagrange polynomial in BIO-IBE simultaneously is a redundancy; it confers no advantage, but simply computational overhead. Therefore, we amend the progression of the BIO-IBE scheme by eliminating either Lagrange polynomial or fuzzy extractor to alleviate computational complexity. Subsequently, we demonstrate that the amendment does not compromise the security of the BIO-IBE scheme. Such amendments can be applied to other BIO-IBE schemes as well. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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