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A two-dimensional random projected minutiae vicinity decomposition-based cancellable fingerprint template

Authors

  • Zhe Jin,

    1. Faculty of Engineering and Science, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
    2. Department of Computer Engineering, Anhui Wonder University of Information Engineering, Hefei, Anhui, China
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  • Bok-Min Goi,

    1. Faculty of Engineering and Science, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
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  • Andrew Teoh,

    Corresponding author
    1. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
    2. Predictive Intelligence Research Cluster, Sunway University, Bandar Sunway, Malaysia
    • Correspondence: Andrew Teoh, School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea.

      E-mail: bjteoh@yonsei.ac.kr

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  • Yong Haur Tay

    1. Faculty of Engineering and Science, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
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ABSTRACT

With the massive deployment of biometric applications, protecting the biometric template has attracted great attention because of the privacy issue. Although many proposals on protecting biometric template have been reported in literature, design a method simultaneously satisfying four criteria, that is performance, non-invertibility, cancellability, and diversity still remains unsolved. In this paper, we proposed a two-dimensional random projected minutiae vicinity decomposition (MVD) technique to secure minutiae-based fingerprint template. Minutiae vicinity is first formed from a set of fingerprint minutiae and further used to generate a set of local features, namely MVD features; then, a random matrix derived from user-specific token is used to project MVD features for the concealment of the topology of MVD. Comprehensive experiments on fingerprint verification competition datasets are carried out, and the lowest equal error rate obtained in the stolen-token scenario is 3.07% and 1.02% for fingerprint verification competition 2002 database 1 and database 2, respectively. Besides, detail analyses on the irreversibility, cancellability, template size, and computational cost have been carried out. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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