CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder-bargaining perspective

Authors


Gurupdesh Pandher, University of British Columbia, Faculty of Management, 3333 University Way, Kelowna, B.C. V1V 1V7, Canada. E-mail: gurupdesh.pandher@ubc.ca

Abstract

This paper studies how CEO pay and its composition is shaped by strategic factors related to the firm's capacity to generate rents and value, the uncertainty of its resource advantage, and the competitive interaction between firm stakeholders and top management. This is done using an analytical framework in which the CEO and other firm stakeholders interact over the firm's resource surplus as utility-maximizing claimants based on their relative bargaining power while providing shareholders their market-based required return. Results from the model yield a number of cogent strategic insights and predictions on the causal interplay between CEO pay, firm growth and risk characteristics, stakeholder management, corporate strategy (e.g., offshoring production), and behavioral biases such as CEO optimism and overconfidence. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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