Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources
Article first published online: 24 MAR 2003
Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Strategic Management Journal
Volume 24, Issue 7, pages 667–675, July 2003
How to Cite
Durand, R. and Vargas, V. (2003), Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources. Strat. Mgmt. J., 24: 667–675. doi: 10.1002/smj.321
- Issue published online: 22 MAY 2003
- Article first published online: 24 MAR 2003
- Manuscript Accepted: 28 JAN 2003
- Manuscript Received: 2 NOV 2000
- private firms;
- productive efficiency;
- agency theory;
- data envelopment analysis (DEA)
The principal–agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 × 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.