Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis
Article first published online: 8 NOV 2006
Copyright © 1990 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Strategic Management Journal
Volume 11, Issue 3, pages 217–230, March/April 1990
How to Cite
Zajac, E. J. (1990), Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis. Strat. Mgmt. J., 11: 217–230. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250110304
- Issue published online: 8 NOV 2006
- Article first published online: 8 NOV 2006
- Manuscript Revised: 8 JUN 1989
- Manuscript Received: 1 AUG 1988
This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.