Authorship is equal, since all sections were written collaboratively.
Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement
Article first published online: 25 MAR 2013
Thought (2013) © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
Volume 1, Issue 3, pages 185–194, September 2012
How to Cite
Arsenault, M. and Irving, Z. C. (2012), Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 1: 185–194. doi: 10.1002/tht3.27
- Issue published online: 25 MAR 2013
- Article first published online: 25 MAR 2013
- Epistemology of Disagreement;
- Higher-Order Evidence;
- Independence Principle;
- Question Begging;
- Trick Questions
We present a family of counter-examples to David Christensen's Independence Criterion, which is central to the epistemology of disagreement. Roughly, independence requires that, when you assess whether to revise your credence in P upon discovering that someone disagrees with you, you shouldn't rely on the reasoning that lead you to your initial credence in P. To do so would beg the question against your interlocutor. Our counter-examples involve questions where, in the course of your reasoning, you almost fall for an easy-to-miss trick. We argue that you can use the step in your reasoning where you (barely) caught the trick as evidence that someone of your general competence level (your interlocutor) likely fell for it. Our cases show that it's permissible to use your reasoning about disputed matters to disregard an interlocutor's disagreement, so long as that reasoning is embedded in the right sort of explanation of why she finds the disputed conclusion plausible, even though it's false.