A Refutation of Frege's Context Principle?
Article first published online: 1 MAR 2012
© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
Volume 1, Issue 1, pages 26–35, March 2012
How to Cite
Barth, A. (2012), A Refutation of Frege's Context Principle?. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 1: 26–35. doi: 10.1002/tht3.4
- Issue published online: 27 MAR 2012
- Article first published online: 1 MAR 2012
This paper explores the limitations of current empirical approaches to the philosophy of language in light of a recent criticism of Frege's context principle. According to this criticism, the context principle is in conflict with certain features of natural language use and this is held to undermine its application in Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that this view is mistaken because the features with which the context principle is alleged to be in conflict are irrelevant to the principle's methodological significance for our understanding of the role of analysis in analytic philosophy.