It Is Not the Case that [P and ‘It Is Not the Case that P’ Is True] nor Is It the Case that [P and ‘P’ Is Not True]

Authors


Correspondence to: E-mail: elia.zardini@ub.edu

Abstract

A new semantic paradox developed by Richard Heck and relying on very minimal logical and truth-theoretic resources is rehearsed. A theory of truth restricting the structural metarule of contraction is presented and some of the theory's relevant features are made explicit. It is then shown how the theory provides a principled solution to the paradox while preserving the extremely compelling truth-theoretic principles at stake, thus bringing out a significant advantage that the theory enjoys over virtually all other non-dialetheic theories. It is finally argued that such advantage is amplified by theoretical considerations made available by the adoption of a correspondentist perspective in the philosophy of truth.

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