Modularity and mental architecture
Article first published online: 3 OCT 2013
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
Volume 4, Issue 6, pages 641–649, November/December 2013
How to Cite
Robbins, P. (2013), Modularity and mental architecture. WIREs Cogn Sci, 4: 641–649. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1255
- Issue published online: 11 OCT 2013
- Article first published online: 3 OCT 2013
- Manuscript Accepted: 6 AUG 2013
- Manuscript Revised: 31 JUL 2013
- Manuscript Received: 6 JUN 2013
Debates about the modularity of cognitive architecture have been ongoing for at least the past three decades, since the publication of Fodor's landmark book The Modularity of Mind. According to Fodor, modularity is essentially tied to informational encapsulation, and as such is only found in the relatively low-level cognitive systems responsible for perception and language. According to Fodor's critics in the evolutionary psychology camp, modularity simply reflects the fine-grained functional specialization dictated by natural selection, and it characterizes virtually all aspects of cognitive architecture, including high-level systems for judgment, decision making, and reasoning. Though both of these perspectives on modularity have garnered support, the current state of evidence and argument suggests that a broader skepticism about modularity may be warranted. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:641–649. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1255
Conflict of interest: The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article.
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