Get access

REPUTATION IN BARGAINING: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS

Authors

  • Michael Conlin

    1. Conlin: Assistant Professor, Dept. of Economics, Syracuse University, 110E Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244. E-mail meconlin@maxwell.syr.edu
    Search for more papers by this author
    • *

      I am grateful to Mike Waldman, Chris phelan, Stacy Dickert-Conlin, participants of the Labor and Theory Workshops at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and participants at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and participants of the Applied Microeconomics Workshop at Cornell University. I am indebted to Michael Duberstein of the NEL Player's Association for providing me the data and invaluable draft information, I am also gratdful to Ted Phillips, vice-presidnet of opesident of the NFL player;s Association for fruitful conversations. I especially thank Larry Samuelson, Jone Kennan, and Yeon-Koo Che for Their comments, insights, and suggestions.


Abstract

This article examines a sequence of two bargaining games where a single buyer participates in both. The bargaining games are modeled with two-sided private information and are “linked” through the buyer's valuation, which is positively correlated across bargaining games. I empirically test the comparative static results obtained from the model's unique equilibrium outcome using National Football League (NFL) contract data. The empirical results suggest that an NFL team's contract negotiations are affected by not only the terms agreed to in the team's prior contract negotiations but also the length of time required to negotiate these prior contracts.

Ancillary