I thank the Institute for International Business at the University of Colorado at Denver for financial support. Helpful comments were received from two anonymous referees, Marcelle Arak, Ajeyo Banerjee, Kang Rae Cho, and seminar participants at University of Colorado at Denver.
Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence
Article first published online: 26 MAR 2007
Volume 43, Issue 1, pages 13–23, January 2005
How to Cite
Eckard, E. W. (2005), Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence. Economic Inquiry, 43: 13–23. doi: 10.1093/ei/cbi002
- Issue published online: 26 MAR 2007
- Article first published online: 26 MAR 2007
Autocratic rulers can use economic regulation under their control to affect individual stock prices and then profit through insider trading. They are therefore less likely to have or enforce insider trading regulation. A cross-sectional analysis of 101 countries with stock markets supports the hypothesis. The probability of observing an enforced insider trading law is much lower in autocracies than in other countries.